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Economic growthDo multinational companies generate positive externalities for the host country? The evidence so far is
mixed varying from beneficial to detrimental effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth, with
many studies that find no effect. In order to provide an explanation for this empirical ambiguity, we
formalize a mechanism that emphasizes the role of local financial markets in enabling FDI to promote growth
through backward linkages. Using realistic parameter values, we quantify the response of growth to FDI and
show that an increase in the share of FDI leads to higher additional growth in financially developed
economies relative to financially under-developed ones.title “FDI Spillovers, Financial
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Within policy circles, there is a widespread belief that foreign direct
investment (FDI) enhances the productivity of host countries and
promotes economic development. This notion stems from the fact that
FDImay not only provide direct capitalfinancingbut also create positive
externalities via the adoption of foreign technology and know-how. Yet,
the empirical evidence on the existence of such positive productivity
externalities is sobering.1
The macro empirical literature finds weak support for an
exogenous positive effect of FDI on economic growth. Findings in
this literature indicate that a country's capacity to take advantage of
FDI externalities might be limited by local conditions, such as the
development of local financial markets or the educational level of thecountry, i.e., absorptive capacities. Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee
(1998) show that the technology FDI brings translates into higher
growth only when the host country has a minimum threshold of stock
of human capital. Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2004)
provide evidence that only countries with well-developed financial
markets gain significantly from FDI in terms of their growth rates.
In terms of the micro empirical evidence, most of the studies using
firm level panel data find no effect of foreign presence or they find
negative productivity spillover effects from multinational enterprises
(MNEs) to the developing country firms.2 Positive spillover effects are
found only for developed countries.3 Based on these negative results, a
new generation of studies argues that since multinationals would like to
prevent information leakage to potential local competitors, but would
benefit from knowledge spillovers to their local suppliers, FDI spilloversarrison (1999). An earlier generation of papers, starting with the
Caves (1974), focused on country case studies and industry level
ies. These studies found a positive correlation between the
ltinational enterprise and average value added per worker of the
in the same sector.
nd Slaughter (2002), for example, find positive spillovers from
s in a panel data set of firms in the U.K.; Gorg and Strobl (2002)
sence reduces exit and encourages entry by domestically owned
h sector in Ireland.
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vertical (inter-industry) externalities instead of horizontal (intra-
industry) externalities. This means the externalities from FDI will
manifest themselves through forward or backward linkages, i.e., contacts
between domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs and their multina-
tional clients in downstream sectors (backward linkage) or between
foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs and their domestic clients in
upstream sectors (forward linkage).4 Javorcik (2004) and Alfaro and
Rodriguez-Clare (2004), for example, find evidence for the existence of
backward linkages between the downstream suppliers and MNEs in
Lithuania; and Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil, respectively. Paralleling the
macro evidence, Villegas-Sanchez (2009), using firm level data from
Mexico, shows that domestic firms only enjoy productivity increases
from FDI if they are located in financially developed regions. She further
shows that domestic firms located in regions where access the credit is
more problematic will experience a negative spillover effect from FDI.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, in a theoretical frame-
work, we formalize one mechanism through which FDI may lead to a
higher growth rate in the host country via backward linkages, which is
consistent with the micro evidence found by the recent-generation
studies described above. Themechanism depends on the extent of the
development of the local financial sector. This channel is also
consistent with the macro literature cited above that shows the
importance of absorptive capacities.5 We are not aware of any other
study that is consistentwith bothmicro andmacro empirical evidence.
In the second half of the paper, using realistic parameter values, we use
the model to quantitatively gauge how the response of growth to FDI
varies with the level of development of the financial markets. To the
best of our knowledge, the paper is unique in this respect.
Our model is a small open economy characterized by two layers of
industries. The downstream industry involves the production of a
final consumption good by combining two intermediary goods/
production processes, which are distinguished by their ownership —
domestic or foreign (multinationals). These production processes,
which are competitive, in turn, combine skilled labor, unskilled labor,
and a range of differentiated inputs to produce their output. The latter
differentiated inputs which form the second upstream industry layer
are characterized by monopolistic competition. As with product
variety endogenous growthmodels, the rate of expansion in the range
of intermediates is the driver of economic growth.6
To operate a firm in the intermediate input sector, entrepreneurs
must develop a new variety of intermediate input, a task that requires
upfront capital investments. The more developed the local financial
markets, the easier it is for credit constrained entrepreneurs to start
their own firms. The increase in the number of varieties of intermediate
inputs leads to positive spillovers to the intermediary processes that
constitute the final good sector. As a result, financial market develop-
ment allows backward linkages between foreign and domestic firms to
turn into FDI spillovers.7 Our model also implies the existence of
horizontal spillovers in the final goods sector since the greater4 Hirschman (1958) argues that the linkage effects are realized when one industry
may facilitate the development of another by easing conditions of production, thereby
setting the pace for further rapid industrialization. He also argues that in the absence
of linkages, foreign investments could have limited or even negative effects in an
economy (the so-called enclave economies).
5 See Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2004) and Harrison and McMillian
(2003) for descriptions of various interactions between financial markets and foreign
and domestic firms.
6 The setup in our model–a final good produced by two production processes which
in turn use other factors of production–is not uncommon. For example, Acemoglu
(1998) has a similar setup where the final good is produced by two production
processes — one skill-intensive and another unskilled intensive which in turn use a
range of intermediate inputs. Markusen and Venables (1999) and Rodríguez-Clare
(1996) adopt similar structures also in a FDI context.
7 In our model, linkages are associated with pecuniary externalities in the
production of inputs. In contrast to knowledge spillovers, pecuniary externalities take
place through market transactions.availability of intermediate inputs not only benefits the foreign firms
but also raises the total factor productivity of the domestic firms in the
final goods sector, thus creating a horizontal spillover as an indirect
result of the backward linkage (e.g. Merlevede and Schoors, 2007).
In ourmodel, however, increases in foreign presence (proxied either
by higher share of foreign firms in the economy or higher firm specific
productivity of the existing ones), will also lead to a reallocation of
resources away from domestic firms to the foreign firms. Therefore, the
instantaneous effect will be a decline in domestic firms' share in final
output. Assuming that foreign owned firms have higher firm specific
productivity, the long run growth rate will be higher.8 In the long run,
both domestic and foreign firms will benefit from the higher growth
rate. However, in the short-run, the horizontal spillovers in the final
goods sector, which indirectly result from the backward linkages
between the foreign firm and the intermediate goods sector, exist only
for the surviving domestic firms. Thus our setup can shed light on why
empirical studies fail tofindevidence of positive horizontal spillovers for
developing countries and even find negative spillovers in some cases.
Instead of these changes in the relevantmarket size for foreign and
domestic firms, there can also be a crowding out effect, where foreign
firms aggravate the existing credit constraints and cause domestic
firms to exit. Indeed, Harrison and McMillian (2003) find that in the
Ivory Coast for the period 1974–1987, borrowing by foreign firms
aggravated domestic firms' credit constraints. However, Harrison et al.
(2004) found that foreign investors tended to “crowd in” domestic
enterprises. Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (forthcoming) argue that
these contrasting results point to the policy complementarities such as
complementarities with financial markets.
We then use the model to provide benchmark estimates on the
effects of FDI on growth. We find that, a) holding the extent of foreign
presence constant, financially well-developed economies experience
growth rates that are almost twice those of economies with poor
financial markets, b) increases in the share of FDI or the relative
productivity of the foreign firm leads to higher additional growth in
financially developed economies compared to those observed in
financially under-developed economies, and finally, c) growth effects
are larger when goods produced by domestic firms and MNEs are
substitutes rather than complements. The exercise highlights the
importance of local conditions such as market structure and human
capital, the so-called absorptive capacities, for generating the positive
effect of FDI on growth. By varying the relative skill endowments–
while assuming that MNEs use skilled labor more intensively–we
obtain results consistent with Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee
(1998) who highlight the critical role of human capital.
The recent evidence fromtheworkof Javorcik andSpatareanu (2005),
among others, supports both our assumptions and findings. Their survey
evidence reveals that one of the reasons multinationals in the Czech
Republic, for example, do not source higher percentage of inputs
domestically is the fact that local firms lack funding for investment
necessary to become suppliers.9 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2007) take one
step forward and examine, using data from the Czech Republic, the
relation between a firm's liquidity constraints and its supply linkages
with multinational corporations. The empirical analysis indicates that
Czech firms supplying MNEs are less credit constrained than non-
suppliers. A closer inspection of the timing of the effect, however, suggest
that this result is due to less constrained firms self-selecting into
becomingMNE suppliers rather that benefits derived from the supplying
relationship. Theirfindings suggest thatwell developedfinancialmarkets
may be needed in order to take full advantage of the benefits associated8 This is the standard market size effect that leads to higher growth rates in
endogenous growth models. Since foreign firms have a productivity advantage,
increasing their share raises the marginal product of the intermediate inputs. This
increasing the latters' profitability and encourages the introduction of more varieties
of intermediates.
9 They found that multinationals source on average 48.3% of inputs from Czech
enterprises.
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functioning credit markets, local firms may find it difficult to start
business relationships with MNEs and thus may not be able to reap the
benefits of productivity spillovers that such relationships bring.10
The importance of well-functioning financial institutions in
augmenting technological innovation and capital accumulation,
fostering entrepreneurial activity and hence economic development
has been recognized and extensively discussed in the literature.11
Furthermore, as McKinnon (1973) stated, the development of capital
markets is “necessary and sufficient” to foster the “adoption of best-
practice technologies and learning by doing.” In other words, limited
access to credit markets restricts entrepreneurial development. In this
paper, we extend this view and argue that the lack of development of
the local financial markets can limit the economy's ability to take
advantage of potential FDI spillovers in a theoretical framework, a
premise which is already supported by the empirical evidence.
Before moving to themodel, it is worth comparing ourmodel to the
ones in FDI and the growth literatures. To the best of our knowledge,
neither literature looked at the role played by financial markets for the
effects of FDI on growth. Theoretical models of FDI spillovers via
backward linkages include Rodríguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen and
Venables (1999). These are static models and do not focus on dynamic
effects of FDI spillovers. Our paper focuses on the growth aspects of
these linkages between the foreign and local buyers of intermediate
inputs, where these linkages interact with financial markets in a certain
way. This is the main contribution of the paper. Our model closely
follows Grossman and Helpman's (1990, 1991) small open economy
setup of endogenous technological progress resulting from product
innovation via increasing intermediate product diversity. We modify
their basic framework to incorporate foreign owned firms and financial
intermediation. The standard Grossman–Helpman setting is preferred
since it provides the most transparent solution. Further, models of FDI
such as the ones mentioned above also use the intermediate product
variety structure in a static setting, thusmaking it a natural choicewhen
moving to a dynamic framework.12 Our results on the importance of the
financial markets also contribute to an emerging literature that
emphasizes the importance of local policies and institutions for the
benefits of FDI to be realized.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 performs a calibration exercise using values for the
parameters from the empirical literature. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Households
Consider a small open economy. The economy is populated by a
continuum of infinitely lived agents of total mass 1. Households





where ρ is the time preference parameter, and Cτ denotes consump-
tion of the final good at time is τ. The final good, denoted by Yt, is a10 See also Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004).
11 See Goldsmith (1969), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and King and Levine
(1993), among others.
12 Recently, Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) have modeled technology
transfers with imperfect financial markets in a Schumpeterian growthmodel, focusing on
the role of credit constraints in impeding international technology transfers while we
focus on the role of financial markets easing the credit constraints and allowing for
increased linkages within an economy once FDI has taken place. Aghion, Comin, and
Howitt (2006) develop a model that highlights the role of local savings in attracting and
complementing foreign investmentwhich spurs innovation and growth,which is closer to
the spirit of our paper.
13 Antras (2003), for example, argues that lack of adequate contract and property rights
enforcement can limit the interaction between foreign and local firms only to hiring labor.numeraire and is freely traded in worldmarkets at a price ptwhichwe
normalize to 1. The total expenditure on consumption is thus given by






−rðτ−tÞwτdτ + At ; ð2Þ
where At denotes the value of the assets held by the household at time t,
and wτ is the wage income. The intertemporal budget constraint
requires that the present value of the expenditures, Eτ, not exceed the
present value of labor income plus the value of asset holdings in the
initial period. The solution of this standard problem implies that the
value of the expenditures must grow at a rate equal to the difference
between the interest rate and the discount rate. However, if this rate of
growth of expenditure is different from the endogenous rate of growth
of the economy then either the transversality condition is violatedor the
economy no longer remains a small open economy. To rule out these
possibilities, we assume that households are credit constrained and can
borrow at most a fixed fraction of their current income. Further, we
assume that this constraint is binding, and therefore the actual rate of







2.2.1. The final goods sector
Final good production combines two intermediary goods or
production processes of domestic and foreign firms denoted respec-
tively by Yt,d and Yt,f, which are not traded. Let pt,d and pt,f denote their
respective prices. The aggregate production function for this com-
posite final good is given by,
Yt = ½Yρt;d + μYρt;f 1=ρ; ð3Þ
where ρ≤1 and ε=1/(1−ρ) represents the elasticity of substitution
between Yt,d and Yt,f. The market for intermediary goods/processes is
competitive. We do not model the decision of foreign firms to enter the
market. Therefore, the aggregator of foreign and domestic firms'
production serves as an artifact that allows us to capture the interaction
of foreign and domestic firms in an economy.We can exogenously vary
μ to capture realistic shares of foreign and domestic firms in the final
output. If ε=∞, foreign and domestic firms produce perfect substitutes;
ε=−∞, they produce complements. If ε=1, theproduction function for
the final good becomes Cobb Douglas. Thus, this aggregator allows us to
consider not just the likely case where foreign and domestic firms are
substitutes, but also when they are complements.
Profit maximization and competitive pricing yields a standard








The cost function is given by,
CðYt ;pt;f ;pt;dÞ = Yt ½p1−εt;d + μεp1−εt;f 
1
1−ε:
Setting the price equal to marginal cost allows us to derive an
expression between the price of the domestic firm and foreign firm
intermediary goods,
pd = ð1−μεp1−εf Þ
1
1−ε: ð5Þ14 This is only an assumption of convenience since, as we will see later, the
entrepreneurs are also credit constrained and we would rather treat both groups the
same to rule out any gains from arbitrage.
18 We allow for a broad interpretation of these barriers, as foreign firms need to bear
a wide range of costs/risks of doing business abroad, including sovereign risk, taxes,
and infrastructure and dealing with different institutions and cultures. We also
245L. Alfaro et al. / Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010) 242–2562.2.2. Foreign and domestic firms production processes
Both foreign and domestic firms' production processes combine
unskilled labor, skilled labor, and a range of intermediate inputs.
Unskilled and skilled labor are not traded and available in fixed
quantities L and H, correspondingly. Competition in the labor market
ensures that unskilled and skilled wages, wt,u and wt,s, are equal to
their respective marginal products.








with 0<βd<1, 0<γd<1, 0<λ<1 and βd+γd+λ=1. Lt,d, Ht,d, and
It,d denote, respectively, the amount of unskilled labor, skilled labor,
and the composite of intermediate inputs used in domestic produc-
tion at any instant in time, and Ad represents the time invariant
productivity parameter.











with 0<βf<1, 0<γf<1, and βf+γf+λ=1 Like before, Lt,f, Ht,f and It,f
denote, respectively, the amount of unskilled labor, skilled labor, and
the composite intermediate input used in the foreign intermediate
production process at any instant in time, and Af represents the time
invariant productivity parameter.15
We assume that foreigners directly produce in the country rather
than license the technology. The industrial organization literature
suggests that firms engage in FDI not because of differences in the cost
of capital but because certain assets are worth more under foreign
than local control. If lower cost of capital were the only advantage a
foreign firm had over domestic firms, it would still remain
unexplained why a foreign investor would endure the troubles of
operating a firm in a different political, legal, and cultural environ-
ment instead of simply making a portfolio investment. An investor's
decision to acquire a foreign company or build a plant instead of
simply exporting or engaging in other forms of contractual arrange-
ments with foreign firms involves two interrelated aspects: owner-
ship of an asset and the location to produce.16 First, a firm can possess
some ownership advantage–a firm specific asset such as a patent,
technology, process, or managerial or organizational know-how–that
enables it to outperform local firms. And this is one of the reasons why
researchers fail to find evidence of horizontal spillovers since this
means that a foreign firm will seek to use this special asset to its
advantage and prevent leakages of its technology. Hence, we model
potential benefits from FDI as occurring via linkages and not through
technology spillovers. However, we do model for the ownership of
intangible assets and know-how by the MNE by allowing for a
differential productivity level than domestic firms. Second, domestic
factors, such as opportunities to tap into local resources, access to low-
cost inputs or low-wage labor, or bypass tariffs that protect a market
from imported goods can also lead to the decision to invest in a
country rather than serve the foreign market through exports. We do
not model the location choices of MNEs, rather we are interested in
understanding the effects of an already occuring foreign investment.17
Finally, since our objective in this paper is to understand the effects of
foreign production on local output and the role of financial markets,15 See Markusen and Venables (1999) and Rodríguez-Clare (1996) for similar
technology assumptions between foreign and domestic firms.
16 This approach to the theory of the multinational firm is also known as the OLI
framework — ownership advantage, localization, internalization. See Dunning (1981).
17 For models that endogenize FDI decisions, see Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984),
and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004).and not the decision to invest abroad, we model the frictions of doing
business in the domestic economy with the parameter ϕ.18
Note that in the above setup, unskilled and skilled labor have
different shares within the domestic and foreign intermediary
production process, though the total labor share is assumed to be
the same across both types of firms. This reflects the common
observation that the share of labor tends to be around two-thirds of
total factor payments while at the same time permitting different skill
intensities within domestic and foreign production. A corollary of
assuming the same total labor share is,
γf−γd = βd−βf : ð8Þ
Following Ethier (1982), we assume that, for a given aggregate
quantity of intermediate inputs used in the final good production,
output is higher when the diversity in the set of inputs used is greater.
This specification captures the productivity gains from increasing
degrees of specialization in the production of final goods.







where xt,i is the amount of each intermediate input i used in
production at time t, and n is the number of varieties available. Let
pi denote the price of a variety i of the intermediate input x. The CES
specification imposes constant and equal elasticity of substitution (1/
(1−α)) between a pair of goods. Each variety of intermediate input
enters the production function identically and themarginal product of
each variety is infinite when xt,i=0. This implies that the firm will use
all the intermediate inputs in the same quantity, thus xt,i=xt.
To capture the importance of proximity between suppliers and
users of inputs, we assume that all varieties of intermediate inputs are
non-traded. This is a common assumption used to capture transpor-
tation costs or local content requirements.19 The same results would
arise if instead of the extreme assumption of non-tradability we
assumed that inputs had significant transportation costs, something
for which there is ample evidence.20 One could assume that there are
some intermediate inputs that are tradable and others that are non-
tradable. In that case, our qualitative results would prevail, while the
quantitative effects would be of smaller magnitude. However, we
believe our assumptions are realistic. As mentioned, Javorcik and
Spatareanu (2005) present survey data that suggest that multi-
nationals are actively engaged in local sourcing in the Czech Republic.
The top reasons reported for cooperating with Czech suppliers
included: low prices, geographic proximity, savings on transport
costs and on import duties. More generally, in many cases, countries
tend to impose local content requirements to foreign firms.
Let Xt=ntxt be the total input of intermediate inputs employed in
production at time t, then we can rewrite It = n
1−α
α
t Xt . Production by






















α : ð11Þconsidered an alternative scenario where MNEs receive a net price pf /ϕ where ϕ>1,
reflecting these disadvantages, obtaining similar results.
19 See Grossman and Helpman (1990), Markusen and Venables (1999) and
Rodríguez-Clare (1996).
20 See Overman, Redding and Venables (2001).
21 Since we will focus exclusively on the balanced growth path, we omit the time
subscript for the rest of the paper.
23 Note that the arbitrage condition does not contradict our assumption of credit
constrained households since they can choose to lend to firms or invest in a risk-free
246 L. Alfaro et al. / Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010) 242–256Thus, raising the varieties of intermediate inputs n, holding the
quantity of intermediate goods constant, raises output productivity.
Using the cost function and the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium all
intermediate inputs are priced similarly, pi=px, we can write the
































2.2.3. The upstream intermediate goods sector
The intermediate inputs sector is characterized by monopolistic
competition. There exists an infinite number of potential varieties of
intermediate inputs, but only a subset of varieties is produced at any
point in time as entrepreneurs are required to develop a new variety.
Since the set of potential intermediate inputs is unbounded, an
entrepreneur will never choose to develop an already existing variety.
Therefore, variety i of x is produced by a single firm which then
chooses the price pi to maximize profits. Firms take as given the price
of competing intermediate inputs, the price of the processed good,
and the price of the factors of production. In a symmetric equilibrium
all intermediate inputs are priced similarly, pi=px. Hence, profit
maximization in every time period for each supplier of variety i
implies,
maxπi = pxxi−cxðwu;ws; xiÞxi; ð14Þ
where cx(wu, ws, xi) represents the cost function and xi=xd+xf is the
sum of the demand for the intermediate input i by domestic and
foreign firms respectively.
Production of intermediate inputs requires both skilled and





Hence, the cost function for the monopolist is given by,
cðwu;ws; xiÞ = δ−δð1−δÞ−ð1−δÞwδuwð1−δÞs xi: ð16Þ
Profit maximization yields the result that each variety is priced at a
constant mark-up (1/α) over the marginal cost.22 Hence, the price of









The fraction that domestic firms spend on all intermediate inputs
is given by the corresponding share in the production function, λpdYd.
This implies that for each intermediate input, the amount spent by
domestic firms is given by λpdYd /n. Similarly, the amount that foreign
firms spend on these inputs is given by λpfYf /n. The sum of amounts












½λpdYd + λpf Yf : ð19Þ
What is the value of introducing new intermediate inputs and thus
the value of the monopolistic firm? Let vt denote the present
discounted value of an infinite stream of profits for a firm that





Equity holders of the firm are entitled to the stream of future
profits of the firm. They make an instantaneous return of (πt+v̇),
(profits and capital gain). They can also invest the same amount in a
risk-free bond and receive return rvt (the prevailing market interest
rate). Arbitrage in capital markets ensures that,




Thus, the rate of return of holding ownership shares is equal to the
interest rate.23
2.2.4. Introduction of new varieties and financial markets
In order to operate a firm in the upstream intermediate input
sector, entrepreneurs must develop a new variety of intermediate
inputs. The introduction of each new variety requires some initial





There are four key features of this startup specification. First, in
contrast to Grossman and Helpman (1991), who assume that new
varieties are developed with two inputs, labor and general knowledge,
we opt only for one input, capital, to simplify the analysis. This
simplification makes our results less dependent on the production
parameters of the innovation sector. This has important advantages for
our calibration exercise, as the stylized facts of the innovation and
imitation processes are not well documented (and in particular for
developing countries). Our central argument is that entrepreneurs face
difficulties in obtaining, for example, loans to set up firms and this
prevents the creation of backward linkages even under the presence of
FDI. Assuming only capital is used for these setup costs then allows us to
focus better on this issue. Secondly, startup capital is increasing in the
size of the labor force. This assumption is incorporated to avoid scale
effects in the model.
Finally, the introduction of a new variety depends on the existing
stock of varieties.We introduce the parameter θ since this allows amore
general production structure. A value of θ<0 suggests a “fishing out”
effect (increasing complexity in introducing new varieties) while a
value of θ>0 implies positive externalities (“standing on the shoulder of
giants”). At this stage, we do not postulate an exact value of θ, however
as it turns out, we will require it to be less than 1.24 Finally, a can be
viewed as the level of efficiency in the innovation sector.
We assume that one unit of final output (Y) can be costlessly
converted into one unit of physical capital and thus the price of each
unit of capital is the same as the price of Y, which in turn has already
been normalized to 1. Therefore, in the absence of credit market
imperfections, the cost of introducing a new variety is the left hand
side of Eq. (21). However, in the presence of imperfect credit markets,bond.
24 For more on the implications of these alternative assumptions, see Jones (1995).
247L. Alfaro et al. / Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010) 242–256the initial capital investment must be financed by borrowing from
domestic financial institutions. The domestic financial system inter-
mediates resources at an additional cost, as in Edwards and Vegh
(1997). This cost reflects the level of development of the domestic
financial markets where lower levels of development are associated
with higher costs. These manifest themselves in a higher instanta-
neous borrowing rate, i which is greater than the lending rate, r.25
This simplification allows us to focus on the main theme of the paper:
the role of financial markets in allowing FDI benefits to materialize.
Thus, this assumption should be regarded as a shortcut to a more
complex modelling of the financial sector. An Appendix, available
upon request from the authors, shows that a cost verification
approach following King and Levine (1993) can be easily embedded
within this model without altering the key predictions. Therefore, the
present discounted value of the stream of interest payments is,
∫∞t iaðL + HÞn−θe−rðs−tÞds =
iaðL + HÞn−θ
r
There is free entry into the innovation sector. Entrepreneurs will
have an incentive to enter if iaðL + HÞn
−θ
r < v. However, this condition
implies that the demand for capital will be infinite, which cannot be
an equilibrium solution. Hence, we can rule out this condition ex-ante.
If, on the other hand, iaðL + HÞn
−θ
r > v, entrepreneurs will have no
incentive to engage in innovation. This possibility cannot be ruled out
ex-ante but would lead to zero growth. Therefore, in equilibrium, if
there is growth in the number of varieties it must be the case that,
iaðL + HÞn−θ
r







i.e., more innovation reduces the value of each firm.26 Using this










Using firm profit Eqs. (19), (22) and (23) we obtain,
rð1−αÞλ
ian1−θ


















As is standard in this class of models, the growth rate of varieties,
ṅ /n, ultimately pins down the growth rate of both domestic and
foreign processed output, and thus aggregate output as well. However
in order to solve for a constant growth rate, we need to first show that
the term in square brackets can be constant.
2.3. General equilibrium and the balanced growth path
We define the balanced growth path as a competitive equilibrium
alongwhich some key variables are constant. In particular, the growth25 As King and Levine (1993) mention, this wedge could reflect taxes, interest
ceilings, required reserve policies, high intermediation costs due to labor regulation, or
high administration costs, etc.
26 We do not consider the implications of population growth as they do not seem
relevant for the focus of this paper. However, footnote (27) discusses some of the
results if it were included.rate of aggregate Y, relative sector shares (pdYd /pfYf), relative prices






To solve for these variables, we begin by substituting Eq. (17) for px
in Eqs. (12) and (13). Next, we define w̃s=ws /(n1− θ) and w̃u=wu /
(n1− θ). Abusing standard terminology, we will refer to these as
efficiency adjusted wages. Using the efficiency unit adjusted wages,












































are also constant. We will
refer to these as p̃d and p̃f, respectively. Thus, while individual prices
themselves are not necessarily constant, relative prices are fixed.












Substituting the expressions for p̃d and p̃f in Eq. (25) and after















It is easy to see that, along the constant growth path sectoral real












Defining Ỹd = Yd = n
λð1−αÞ
α and Ỹ f = Yf = n
λð1−αÞ
α which can be viewed as












Finally, using Eqs. (28) and (29), one can deduce that GDP, Y, will
grow at the rate ð1−θÞ ṅn. Next, we show that we can solve for the





































Equilibrium conditions in the labor market imply that the labor
employed by the downstream domestic and foreign, and the
upstream intermediate input production processes add up to the
28 If we restrict ourselves to the special case of where the aggregator is a Cobb
Douglas function, we can solve explicitly for all the endogenous variables. The
solutions are included in an Appendix, available upon request from the authors.
29 Erosa (2001) defines the financial intermediation cost as the resources used per
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unskilled labor, respectively,
Ld + Lf + nLx = L; ð34Þ
Hd + Hf + nHx = H: ð35Þ
Using the cost functions for the domestic and foreign processes
and the intermediate input sector, Shephard's Lemma, and expressing
the prices, wages, and output in terms of their respective efficiency
adjusted versions, we can rewrite these constraints as,
ðβd + δαλÞ p̃d Ỹd
w̃u
+
ðβf + δαλÞ p̃f Ỹ f
w̃u
= L; ð36Þ
ðγd + ð1−δÞαλÞ p̃d Ỹd
w̃s
+
ðγf + ð1−δÞαλÞ p̃f Ỹ f
w̃s
= H: ð37Þ
Now we can solve for all the endogenous variables and derive the
equilibrium balanced growth. In order to be able to solve the
equilibrium growth rate of varieties,
ṅ
n
, we need to solve the set of
prices {pd, pf, w̃u, w̃s} and the outputs of the domestic and foreign
sectors, {Ỹd, Ỹf}. To solve for the prices and the outputs, we use
Eqs. (4), (5), (32), (33), (36) and (37). These equations can be solved
in a sequential order. While we can solve for the FOCs and derive
implicit relationships, because of Eq. (5), we cannot derive explicit
solutions for the endogenous variables in terms of the parameters.
Our model exhibits some of the standard properties of product












we can see that, higher λ, which is the share of intermediate input
costs in the intermediate production process, also drives up the
growth rate of n. Obviously this is because a larger λ implies a larger
market size for intermediate inputs producers. An increase in either,
Af, or μ, will lead to a reallocation of resources away from the domestic
firm to the foreign firm. Therefore, the instantaneous effect will be a
decline in domestic firms' share in output. In the long run, both
domestic and foreign firms will benefit from the higher growth rate.
However, in the short-run, the horizontal spillovers in the final goods
sector, which indirectly result from the backward linkages between
the foreign firm and the intermediate goods sector, exist only for the
surviving domestic firms. This is an additional contribution of our
setup, which can shed light on why empirical studies fail to find
evidence of positive horizontal spillovers for developing countries and
even find negative spillovers in some cases.27
Moving on to the role of the financial markets, one can see that the
borrowing rate has a negative effect on the growth rate. It reflects the
higher per unit cost of initial capital investment. The lending rate
works through at least two channels—a positive and a negative one.
The positive effect reflects a lower wedge between the two rates. The
negative effect is more standard in that it reflects the higher
opportunity cost of investing in the project and thus tends to lower
the growth rate. However, a visual inspection of the above equation27 So far, we have avoided discussion of population growth. Our main reason for
doing so is to abstract from potential issues of differential fertility in the two types of
population. This would further complicate the analysis by raising issues of human
capital accumulation which are beyond the scope of the paper. However, if we
assumed that population grew exogenously at the same rate (l) across the two groups,




n + l and aggregate Y growing at the ð1−θÞ ṅn + l. The rate of growth of prices
and wages is unchanged.suggests, trivially, that the net effect of an increase in rwill be to raise
the growth rate (assuming, of course, that the growth rate is already
positive). However, a third channel via which an increase in r may
work is by increasing i. This would make the overall effect of an
increase in r ambiguous.28
Next, we turn to the calibration exercises, where by using
empirical estimates of our parameters we quantitatively study the
comparative static effects we have discussed so far.
3. Calibration exercise
The purpose of the calibration exercise is to study the quantitative
growth effects of FDI, focusing on different levels of financial market
development. We begin with a description of the parameters used in
the analysis.
Financial development: We group countries based on their financial
market development levels. Different measures have been used in the
literature to proxy for financial market development. The broader
financial market development measures, such as the monetary-
aggregates as a share of GDP and the private sector credit extended by
financial institutions as a share of GDP, capture the extent of financial
intermediation; interest rate spreads, on the other hand, capture the
cost of intermediation. Given that the spread between the lending and
borrowing rates better captures the spirit of our model, we prefer it as
the measure for the development of the financial markets.29 We find
that the alternative measures of financial market development, such
as the size of the financial market, the share of private sector credit in
total banking activity, and the overhead costs are all highly correlated
with interest rate spreads. Hence, different measures yield similar
results. The average spread for the low financially developed (poor)
countries, medium financially developed (middle income) countries
and the high financially developed (rich) countries between 2000 and
2003 are 14.5%, 8.5%, and 4.5%, respectively.
Elasticity of substitution: In our model, ρ relates to the elasticity of
substitution between goods produced by foreign and domestic firms.
Evidence regarding the appropriate choice of the elasticity of
substitution parameter ρ is sparse, given that such depiction of final
goods production is an artifact to capture the interaction between
foreign and domestic firms. The evidence that is closest to the spirit of
our model is from the consumption literature that uses a constant
elasticity of substitution utility function between varieties of domestic
and foreign goods, or between tradable and non-tradable goods. Ruhl
(2005) provides a detailed overview of the Armington elasticity, i.e.,
the elasticity of substitution between foreign and home goods, and
finds that an appropriate value for ρ is around 0.2.30 While our
benchmark analysis is based on the CES production function with
ρ=0.2, we also undertake robustness analysis by allowing ρ to vary
between −0.9 and 0.9.
The share of intermediate goods in the production of the final good
(λ) is assumed to be the same across the two production technologies.
The formulation of the production technology allows setting the share
of the intermediate goods equal to the share of physical capital in final
goods production. Following Gollin (2002), we set this share equal to
1/3. The remaining 2/3 is accounted by skilled and unskilled labor. Theunit of value that is intermediated, which is the total value of financial assets owned by
the financial institutions. He measures the financial intermediation cost as the spread
between the lending and borrowing rates.
30 A wide range of estimates are available from trade and business cycles literatures
ranging between 0 and 0.5. Ruhl (2005) argues that a model with temporary and
permanent trade shocks can replicate both the low elasticity of substitution figures
used by the international real business cycle studies and the high elasticity of
substitution values found by the empirical trade studies. Such an encompassing model




Common parameters for three groups
α=0.91 r=0.05 ϕ=1
Production function parameters
βd=0.34 β f=0.27 δ=0.5




High (rich) 0.045 5
Medium (middle) 0.085 5









Notes: We group countries based on their financial market development levels, using
the interest rate spreads. The average spread for the low financially developed (poor)
countries, medium financially developed (middle income) countries and the high
financially developed (rich) countries between 2000 and 2003 are 14.5%, 8.5%, and 4.5%,
respectively. In the benchmark case, all countries have the same ratio of unskilled to
skilled labor equal to 5. In the sensitivity analysis, we set the ratio of unskilled labor to
skilled labor equal to 12 for the poor countries, 9 for the middle income countries, and 5
for the rich countries (taken from Duffy et al., 2004).
249L. Alfaro et al. / Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010) 242–256remaining parameters used in the benchmark analysis are chosen
such that those for the domestic firm capture the characteristics of the
production technologies available in the developing countries;
whereas, those for the foreign firm capture the characteristics of the
production technologies available in the industrial countries.
Domestic firms: According to Weil (2004), the share of wages paid
to skilled labor is 49% for the developing countries. We take this value
to be that of domestic firms, suggesting that of labor's 2/3rd share in
final goods production, 49% is due to skilled labor. Therefore, we set
the share of skilled labor in domestic firms, γd, at 32%. In parallel, the
share of unskilled labor in domestic firms, βd, is set at 35%. For the
benchmark analysis, we set the total factor productivity Ad equal to 1.
Foreign firms: The share of skilled and unskilled labor costs in
output of the foreign firm is calculated in a similar fashion. Following
Weil (2004), the share of wages paid to skilled labor is taken as 65% in
industrial countries. Accordingly, the share of skilled labor in the
foreign firm's production, γf, is set equal to 40%. Similarly, the share of
unskilled labor, βf, is set equal to 27%. Thus, γf>γd31 As a benchmark,
the productivity of the foreign firm, Af, is initially set to be twice that
of the domestic firm following Hall and Jones (1999), who show the
productivity parameter for a very large sample of non-industrial
countries is around 45% of the productivity parameter of the U.S. With
respect to the cost of doing business that the foreign firms face, ϕ, our
benchmark case is onewhere there is no such cost. However, note that
an increase in the cost of doing business is equivalent to lower
productivity of foreign firms. Thus, by considering variations in relative
productivities, we can also infer implications for the variations in cost of
doing business.
Share of foreign production: The share of foreign production to total
output is not exogenous in the CES production function case and the
choice of μ implicitly determines this share. As such, the benchmark
value for μ is determined to allow for the matching of the relative
output values to the real data. Lipsey (2002) estimates that in 1995
the share of world production due to FDI flows was at best 8%.32
Keeping this in mind, we set μ=0.1 as our benchmark value since, as
we shall see later, it produces a share of approximately 6%.
Intermediate input sector: Based on the work of Basu (1996), the
mark-up is assumed to be 10%, and hence the value of the reciprocal of
(1+mark-up) is given by α=0.91. Given the lack of any estimate, the
share of unskilled labor in the production of the intermediate goods, δ,
is taken as 0.5.
The stock of skilled and unskilled labor: H and L, respectively, are set
following Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004).33 We
calculate averages of their data for the low financially developed
(poor) countries, medium financially developed (middle income)
countries, and the high financially developed (rich) countries.
Accordingly, we set the ratio of unskilled labor to skilled labor equal
to 12 for the poor countries, 9 for the middle income countries, and 5
for the rich countries. To rule out the possibility of scale effects driving
differences in growth rates, we assume that H+L=1. The shares of
the two factors are allocated according to these three ratios so that
they sum to 1 (e.g., for poor countries H=0.077 and L=0.923).
Additional parameters: The cost of introducing a new variety, a, is
taken to be a free parameter. The model is calibrated to allow for the
financially well-developed country growth rates to match the U.S.
growth rate. Given the fact that the U.S. is often considered to be the31 As Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) note, there is ample evidence that foreign
firms employ more skilled personnel than domestic firms. They also tend to be larger,
more efficient, and pay higher wages.
32 Mataloni (2005) finds that foreign owned companies were responsible for 12% of
GDP in Australia, 5% in Italy, 7% in Finland, 19% in Hungary, and 22% in the Czech
Republic.
33 The authors argue that there is an aggregation bias caused by differences in terms
of efficiency units of the different types of labor. To overcome this bias, they weigh the
length of education by the returns to schooling, and compute what they call
“weighted” labor stock data.technological leader, one can assume that the productivity of foreign
firms in theU.S. is no different than the productivity of the domestic U.S.
firms, so that Af/(ϕAd)=1, to back out a. The U.S. growth rate of real
GDP was approximately 3.5% for the period 1930–2000. This condition
and the other parameters above pin down a=0.6. We use the value of
a=0.75 also in the sensitivity analysis when we allow the ρ value to
range between−0.9 and 0.9.
The risk-free interest rate is assumed to be 5%. Finally, the
parameter capturing the ease of developing new variety of products,
θ, does not have any obvious real-world counterpart. Given that, we
simply set it to θ=1−(λ(1−α)/α).34 Table 1 summarizes all the
parameter values.
We consider two scenarios that reflect the benefits of FDI. The first
scenario is an exogenous increase in the share of FDI due to increases
in μ. Increases in μ in the CES aggregator lead to a higher share of
foreign output in GDP. This exercise answers the straightforward
question: What happens to the overall growth rate of the economy if
the more productive MNE's produce a higher share of output? The
second scenario is where advances in innovation in the parent country
are transmitted through FDI to the host country. These technological
benefits of FDI are captured through the productivity parameter of the
foreign firm (i.e, an increase in Af). Our initial tests are based on the
effects of a 15% increase in the productivity of the foreign firm relative
to the domestic firm. Starting with our benchmark value of Af /
ϕAd=2, this would mean a new value of Af /ϕAd=2.3 (ϕ=1 in both
cases). Later on when undertaking sensitivity tests, we consider a
range of values between 1.15 and 2.6. The lower bound of 1.15 is
based on Aitken and Harrison's (1999) finding that as a plant goes
from being domestically owned to fully foreign owned, its produc-
tivity increases by about 10% to 16%. Given there is no consensus in34 The numerical exercise is based on a θ value that is dictated by the balanced
growth path for the model. We further solve the model for alternative θ values and













(p fY f) /(pdYd+p fY f)
0.1 3.10 2.14 1.43 0.061
0.2 4.36 3.01 2.04 0.134
0.3 6.19 4.31 2.93 0.205
0.4 8.76 6.12 4.18 0.269
0.5 12.28 8.59 5.89 0.327
0.6 17.01 11.92 8.20 0.379
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. Growth rates are in percent. The relative
labor endowments are constant at the level of rich (high financial development)
countries and ρ=0.2.
Table 3
















in p fY fΔ(p fY f) /
(pdYd+p fY f)
0.1 to 0.2 1.26 0.87 0.61 7.3 203.2
0.2 to 0.3 1.83 1.29 0.89 7.1 114.1
0.3 to 0.4 2.57 1.81 1.25 6.4 84.8
0.4 to 0.5 3.52 2.47 1.71 5.8 69.6
0.5 to 0.6 4.73 3.33 2.31 5.2 59.9
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless
reported otherwise. The relative labor endowments are constant at the level of rich
(high financial development) countries and ρ=0.2.
Table 4











Δ Relative output Percent
change
in p fY f
Δ(p fY f)/(p fY f+pdYd)
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providing a more comprehensive picture.35
Under both of these scenarios, H/L ratios are held fixed for each
country in the benchmark analysis. Hence, the resulting differences in
the growth rates do not reflect human capital differences, rather they
reflect variations in FDI. Both scenarios are studied separately for the
CES and the Cobb Douglas production function cases, where the
results for the CES production function case are reported in Section 1
and the Cobb Douglas production case is reported in the Appendix.
3.1. Simulation results
The benchmark results for the CES production function with
ρ=0.2 (i.e. an elasticity of substitution of 1.25) are reported in
Table 2. As Table 2 indicates, when μ=0.1 foreign production equals
around 6.1% of total production, while, when μ=0.2, the same ratio
increases to around 13.4%. Hence, as alluded to earlier, we use μ=0.1
in most of the analysis. However, for the sake of completeness, the
tables also list results for increments of 0.1 for μ until μ=0.6.36
3.1.1. Changes in relative productivities and shares of MNE
The first scenario capturing an increase in the foreign presence is an
exogenous increase in the FDI share (higher μ). Table 2 lists the growth
rates for the three different levels of financial development in addition
to the amount of foreign output relative to domestic output (valued at
their respective prices). In order to ease the discussion, in Table 3, we
alsopresent the results of Table 2 as changes over increments of 0.1 for μ.35 Note that our consideration of a range for Af /ϕAd from 1.15 to 2.6 can also be
implicitly used to understand the effects of variations in the cost of doing business, ϕ,
when Af=2Ad. Thus, Af /ϕAd=2.6 would correspond to ϕ=0.77 and Af /ϕAd=1.15 to
ϕ=1.74. A value of ϕ<1 might reflect a situation where the host country government
enacts policies to attract FDI (e.g., fiscal or financial incentives, special laws to bypass
cumbersome bureaucratic regulations that domestic firms are ordinarily subjected to),
whereas ϕ>1 could reflect the usual additional costs of business discussed earlier.
36 We restrict our attention to μ≤0.6 since this range covers most realistic values of
foreign output shares.For example, results in Table 3 show that the increase in μ from0.1 to 0.2
corresponds to a tripling of the foreign output level. This increase in FDI
also creates a 1.26 percentage point increase in the average growth rate
of the financially well-developed countries, a 0.78 percentage point
increase in theaveragegrowth rate of thefinanciallymediumdeveloped
countries, and a 0.61 percentage point increase in the average growth
rate of the financially poorly developed countries. That is, for the same
amount of increase in the share of FDI, the additional growth ratesmade
possible in financiallywell developed countries are almost double those
made possible in financially poorly developed countries.
These numbersmay appear to be quite high and onemight wonder
if the 1.26 percentage point increase for developed economies is an
overestimate. There are a couple of things to keep in mind. First, note
that we have assumed Af /ϕAd=2 in these exercises. For financially
developed economies, the actual gap between domestic and foreign
producers is likely to be much lower and thus the estimate might be
too high. Secondly, as μ increases, it is possible that new MNEs
entering a domestic market might be of lower productivity than the
first entrants. This could also potentially further reduce the produc-
tivity gap between domestic and foreign firms. Nevertheless, the
differences in growth rates particularly between the medium level
and the low level groups are still significantly different.
Another interesting result that emerges from Table 3 is that the
change in the growth rates are higher when initial FDI participation is
greater. For example, as μ increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the additional
growth for a country with poorly developed financial markets is 0.61
percentage points while going from 0.3 to 0.4 leads to an additional
growth rate of 1.26 percentage points. Of course, one might wonder
what actually happens to foreign output shares (which are a corollary
of changes in μ but are easier to interpret). We already have seen that
the movement from 0.1 to 0.2 leads to an output share increase from
6.1% to 13.4% of GDP. From the fourth column in Table 2, it is easy to
see that as μ moves from 0.3 to 0.4, foreign output share goes from
20.5% to 26.9%. Thus, the increase in output share is slightly lower in
the second case, while the increase in growth rate is higher.
Moving on to Table 4, we obtain similar qualitative results when the
increase in the extent of foreign presence is captured through an
increase in the relative productivity, Af/(ϕAd). These results, combined
with the ones from the earlier table, suggest that regardless of the source
of the increase in the extent of foreign presence in the local economy, for
the same magnitude of increase in foreign presence, the additional
growth effects generated in the local economy are higher for the
financially well developed countries than those generated in the
financially medium developed countries, and these are higher than
those generated in thefinancially poorly developed countries. However,
an important difference is that the additional growth rates generated by
improvements in the relative productivity of the foreign firm are
quantitatively much lower than those discussed previously for the case
of an increase in the share of FDI (higher μ). For example, 15% increase in0.1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.2 4.2
0.2 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.4 5.0
0.3 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.5 5.8
0.4 0.35 0.24 0.17 0.7 6.6
0.5 0.59 0.41 0.29 0.8 7.2
0.6 0.94 0.66 0.46 0.9 7.8
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless
reported otherwise. The relative labor endowments are constant at the level of rich
(high financial development) countries and ρ=0.2. A 15% increase in Af /Ad implies
that this ratio increases in value from 2 to 2.3.
37 We also allow for changes in the cost of doing business (ϕ), which in our model
has similar effects to those of a relative increase in the productivity to foreign firms.
Note that although the interpretation is symmetric, the policy implications are
different. One suggests that the authorities should improve the business environment
to benefit more from FDI; the other that attracting more productive foreign firms
relative to domestic firms, everything else being equal, implies higher growth rates.
Table 5




















0.1 3.10 1.69 0.97 6.1 6.1 6.0
0.2 4.35 2.39 1.40 13.4 13.3 13.2
0.3 6.17 3.41 2.02 20.5 20.3 20.2
0.4 8.74 4.85 2.90 26.9 26.7 26.6
0.5 12.25 6.81 4.10 32.7 32.5 32.4
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. Growth rates are in percent. The relative
labor endowments change together with financial development as high, medium and
low; ρ=0.2.
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the financially well developed countries by 0.03 percentage points, the
growth rate of the financially medium developed countries by 0.02
percentage points, and the growth rate of the financially poorly
developed countries by 0.01 percentage points. The higher relative
productivity of the foreign firm corresponds to an only 4.2% increase in
the total value of foreign production, pfYf, and thus only a marginal
increase in the share of foreign production in total production. These
results hold qualitatively across alternative μ assumptions.
Obviously, one would be led to wonder why the effects are so
dissimilar. An obvious resolution lies in the way that the two
alternative scenarios work. Irrespective of the productivity advantage
that foreign firms enjoy, an increase in μ ensures a higher share of total
expenditures will be devoted to the output produced by foreign firms.
The fact that Af>Ad ensures that this shift translates into a scale effect.
Thus, the exercise in altering μ, simply answers the question–given
realistic productivity differences between domestic firms and foreign
firms–what would a higher share of multinational production mean
for the economy at various levels of financial development? On the
other hand, for any given μ, changes in Af relative to Ad have effects
that are slightly more “indirect” in the following sense. An increase in
Af /Ad will reduce the relative price of the foreign good and thus will
create a substitution away from the domestic good towards the foreign
good. Thus, while the relative price goes down, the relative quantity
goes up.With the elasticity of substitution beingmore than1,we know
that the overall effect is to increase pfYf relative to pdYd. However, as
the numbers in Table 4 indicate, the changes are small, and thus the
overall growth effect, not surprisingly, will be small. One possibility is
that the choice of ρ=0.2, which implies an elasticity of substitution of
1.25, has an important bearing on these magnitudes. In the next
subsection, which deals with the sensitivity of our results, we explore
the implications of varying this parameter.
An alternativeway is to compare the elasticities of changes in growth
due to changes in the parameters of the foreign production firm. For
example, instead of restricting ourselves to specific increases in μ or Af/
Ad (which may not be strictly comparable), we could compare the
subsequent simultaneous increases in the share of MNE output in total
GDPand the associated increase in thegrowth rate. Tofix ideas, consider
row 1 of both Tables 3 and 4. In the case of countries with poorly
developed financial markets, following an increase in μ from 0.1 to 0.2,
we see that the rate of growth of GDP increases by 0.61 percentage
points while the share of MNE output in total GDP increases by 7.3
percentage points (from6.1% to 13.4%). Dividing the former by the latter
produces a value of 0.08. This is equivalent to saying that for every 1
percentagepoint increase in the shareofMNEoutput inGDP, thegrowth
rate of the economy rises by 0.08 percentage point. Now consider
instead an increase in Af/Ad. Beginning from the benchmark (row 1
of 2), a 15% increase in Af/Ad, as we have already seen, raises the growth
rate for poorly financially developed countries by 0.01 percentage
points. At the same time the share of foreign firm produced output in
GDP increases by 0.2 percentage points. Here the elasticity is 0.05. This
suggests that following an increase in Af/Ad, every 1 percentage point
increase in theMNE share of output is associatedwith a 0.05 percentage
point increase in the growth rate Thus, the elasticity measures of the
effects of changes in μ and Af/Ad are much less disparate. We can also
revisit the comparison between countries with well and poorly
developed financial developed financial markets. In the case of the
former, the elasticity measures yield values of 0.17 and 0.15 following
increases in μ and Af/Ad respectively. Like our earlier findings, we still
see that an increase in MNE share of output is associated with higher
rates of economic growth for financially well developed economies.
Thus far, we have considered two alternative scenarios with
qualitatively similar but quantitatively distinct outcomes. This leads to
the next question—which one is more likely to hold in practice? The
first scenario where μ increases seems to be more applicable to a
“cross-section” analysis. With two countries beginning at the sameMNE share (of GDP) but different levels of financial market
development, it tells us what happens to the growth rate if the MNE
share of GDP increases further. Alternatively, going down column (3)
of Table 2—we can ask what happens to the growth rate for different
MNE shares for the same level of financial development. These are also
the kind of questions that growth regressions often seek to answer.
The second scenario, where Af increases relative to Ad, addresses a
slightly different issue. It provides a framework to understand what
happens as some firms shift to using a more productive technology.
This for instance, would be applicable when domestic firms are
acquired bymultinational enterprises, which then bring their superior
technology to these firms. Obviously, this also reflects greater MNE
“participation,”however, it does not take an increase in output share as
a given but as an endogenous outcome of this change. Thus, both
scenarios have their respective contributions.
3.2. Sensitivity analysis
Next we examine how the results change with the other
parameters or “local conditions.” We focus on changes in relative
skill endowments across countries (varying H/L), the effects of
alternative productivity gaps, and finally, varying the elasticity of
substitution (by varying ρ).37
3.2.1. Changes in labor endowments
The above exercise kept the relative labor endowments constant
across the three groups of countries in order to observe the differences
solely on account of financial market development differences and
changes in the share and/or productivity of foreign firms. The three
groups however also differ in their relative labor endowments, as shown
in the lower panel of Table 1. When allowing for different labor
endowments, Table 5 shows that the growth effects of higher FDI in the
countries with well developed financial markets are three times more
than the ones with the poor developed financial markets. Tables 6 and 7
present, respectively, the results when we allow for the relative labor
endowments to differ among the three groups togetherwith the changes
in the share of foreign firms, and with the changes in the productivity of
foreign firms.
Whenwe compare Table 5 to Table 2, we see that the actual growth
rates for countries with medium and poorly developed financial
markets are now even lower. Indeed, the growth rate of the countries
with low levels of financial market development is now only 0.97%
compared to 1.43% earlier. Thus, the introduction of human capital
variations across groups exacerbates differences in growth rates.
Table 6



















0.1–0.2 1.25 0.70 0.43 7.3 7.2 7.2 203.2 202.5 202.2
0.2–0.3 1.83 1.02 0.62 7.1 7.0 6.9 114.1 113.6 113.4
0.3–0.4 2.56 1.43 0.88 6.4 6.4 6.4 84.8 84.4 84.2
0.4–0.5 3.51 1.96 1.20 5.8 5.8 5.8 69.6 69.2 69.1
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported otherwise. Relative outputs are valued at their respective price. The relative labor
endowments change together with financial development as high, medium, low; and ρ=0.2.
Table 7



















0.1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.2 0.2 0.2 4.23 4.23 4.22
0.2 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.4 0.4 0.4 5.04 5.03 5.02
0.3 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.5 0.6 0.6 5.83 5.81 5.80
0.4 0.35 0.19 0.12 0.7 0.7 0.7 6.56 6.56 6.52
0.5 0.59 0.33 0.20 0.8 0.8 0.7 7.21 7.19 7.18
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless reported otherwise. Relative outputs are valued at their respective price. The relative labor
endowments change together with financial development as high, medium, low; and ρ=0.2.
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comparing Tables 3 and 6. The differences in the additional growth
rates are also much higher once one allows for human capital
differences. When μ increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the countries with
medium level of financial development see their growth increase by
0.70 percentage points, while countries with low level of financial
development see their growth increase by 0.43 percentage points.
When focusing on productivity gaps, we also find that growth rate
differences become larger. Comparing the results in Tables 4 and 7, one
observes that when μ=0.2, for example, the additional growth rate
generated is 0.06 (Table 4) for the financially medium developed
countries. When the labor endowments of these countries decrease to
the actual level, the additional growth rate decreases to 0.05 (Table 7).
These results imply that the 0.01 percentage points additional growth
was due to the higher quality labor endowments. However, like before,
productivity gaps themselves have growth effects that are of much
smaller magnitude than changes in μ. Overall, these results suggestTable 8
Increasing foreign productivity and presence for different relative productivity levels.
Panel A: Increasing foreign productivity effect of increases in Af /Ad for different values o
Δ Growth high Δ Growth medium Δ Growth low Δ Growth high Δ Gr
Af /Ad μ=0.1 μ=0.1 μ=0.1 μ=0.2
1.15 to 1.32 0.02 0.01 0.008 0.07
1.52 0.03 0.01 0.009 0.07
1.75 0.03 0.01 0.009 0.08
2.0 0.03 0.01 0.009 0.08
2.3 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09
2.6 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08
Panel B: Increasing foreign presence effect of increases in μ for different values of Af /Ad
Δ Growth high Δ Growth medium Δ Growth low Δ Growth high Δ Gr
Af /Ad Δμ 0.1 to 0.2 Δμ 0.1 to 0.2 Δμ 0.1 to 0.2 Δμ 0.2 to 0.3 Δ
1.15 1.05 0.59 0.36 1.49
1.32 1.10 0.62 0.38 1.56
1.52 1.15 0.64 0.39 1.65
1.75 1.20 0.67 0.41 1.74
2.00 1.25 0.70 0.43 1.83
2.30 1.31 0.74 0.45 1.93
2.60 1.37 0.77 0.47 2.02
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. All changes are in percentage points unless
development as high, medium, low; and ρ=0.2.that countries with more skill-intensive labor endowments benefit
more in terms of growth effects from FDI, which is consistent with the
empirical studies such as Borensztein et al. (1998).3.2.2. Alternative measures of relative productivity
So far in the analysis, in setting the parameters regarding the
relative productivity of the foreign and domestic firms, Af /ϕAd, we
made use of the information from macro level studies showing that
the relative productivity difference between the industrialized and
developing countries is approximately 2. Micro level studies provide
further information regarding the productivity differences between
foreign owned and domestic owned firms and, as we discussed above,
a wide range of micro estimates are available. We report results in
Table 8 panels A and B starting with the lowest value from the micro
evidence, namely 1.15 (taken from Aitken and Harrison, 1999) and
allow for increments of approximately 15% in this value.f μ
owth medium Δ Growth low Δ Growth high Δ Growth medium Δ Growth low
μ=0.2 μ=0.2 μ=0.3 μ=0.3 μ=0.3
0.04 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.05
0.04 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.05
0.04 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.06
0.04 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.06
0.05 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.06
0.05 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.06
owth medium Δ Growth low Δ Growth high Δ Growth medium Δ Growth low
μ 0.2 to 0.3 Δμ 0.2 to 0.3 Δμ 0.3 to 0.4 Δμ 0.3 to 0.4 Δμ 0.3 to 0.4
0.83 0.51 2.04 1.14 0.70
0.88 0.54 2.16 1.20 0.74
0.92 0.57 2.29 1.28 0.78
0.97 0.60 2.43 1.36 0.83
1.02 0.63 2.57 1.43 0.88
1.08 0.66 2.73 1.52 0.93
1.13 0.69 2.88 1.61 0.98
reported otherwise. The relative labor endowments change together with financial
Table 9










(p fY f) /
(p fY f+pdYd)
ρ=−0.2 (complements)
0.1 1.03 0.67 0.42 11.74
0.2 0.54 0.33 0.18 19.16
ρ=0.2 (substitutes)
0.1 3.10 2.13 1.42 6.10
0.2 4.35 3.01 2.03 13.42
Notes: See Table 1 for the parameter values. Growth rates are in percent. The relative labor
endowments are constant at the level of rich (high financial development) countries.
Table 10














0.2 0.029 0.016 0.010 0.087 0.049 0.030
0.4 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.040 0.022 0.013
0.6 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.017 0.009 0.005
0.8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000
−0.2 0.020 0.011 0.007 0.019 0.011 0.007
−0.4 0.029 0.017 0.010 0.033 0.019 0.011
−0.6 0.035 0.020 0.012 0.040 0.023 0.014














0.2 0.187 0.104 0.064 0.346 0.193 0.118
0.4 0.081 0.045 0.027 0.138 0.076 0.046
0.6 0.045 0.024 0.015 0.089 0.048 0.029
0.8 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.047 0.023 0.013
−0.2 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.004
−0.4 0.032 0.018 0.011 0.030 0.017 0.011
−0.6 0.041 0.024 0.014 0.041 0.023 0.014
−0.8 0.047 0.027 0.017 0.048 0.027 0.017
Notes: Growth rates are in percent. The relative labor endowment varies by group. The
relative labor endowments change together with financial development as high,
medium and low; as in Table 5. The changes in growth rates are reported as percentage
point changes.
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groups of countries when the technology gap among the foreign and
domestic firms change for different values of μ The results for the
benchmark case (μ=0.1) suggest that increments of 15% increases in
the technology gap between the foreign and domestic firms creates
additional growth rates of 0.020 percentage points in the financially
well developed countries, 0.010 percentage points in the financially
medium developed countries, and 0.008 percentage points in the
financially poorly developed countries. If the technology gap measure
increases by 100%, to 2.3, one has to look at the cumulative of the
additional growth values reported in Panel A. For the financially well
developed countries, this doubling of the relative productivity
measure creates an additional 0.17 percentage point growth, while
creating around 0.06 percentage point growth in the financially
medium developed, and around 0.05 percentage point growth in the
financially poorly developed countries. Panel B alternatively looks into
the additional growth rates due to increased foreign presence
measured through changes in μ, rather than through changes in the
technology gap. The same results prevail, where the additional growth
rates are almost triple for the financially well developed countries
than for the financially poorly developed countries.3.2.3. Changes in the elasticity of substitution
Table 9 compares the growth rates in the high, medium and low
financially developed economies for ρ=−0.2 in the upper panel and
ρ=0.2 in the lower panel. In particular, when the elasticity of
substitution is greater than 1 (ρ>0), for the same value of μ, we
observe much higher growth rates. Further increases in μ (i.e., a greater
MNEpresence),while leading to increases in the growth rate forρ=0.2,
actually reduces growth rates when ρ=−0.2, despite increasing MNE
share in output. Thus, clearly, the elasticity of substitution in the
aggregator plays a key role in our numerical exercises. These results
suggest one must be cautious when talking of attracting “FDI that is
complementary to local production.” Such complementarity is useful
when one talks of final and intermediate industry relationships.
However, it does not necessarily raise the growth rates when domestic
and foreign producers supply complementary final goods.
Finally, we consider the extent to which a change in the growth rate
following an increase in the overall productivity gap (Af/ϕAd) is affected
by the choice of the elasticity of substitution parameter. As earlier, we
consider the implications of a 15% increase in the overall productivity
gap. Table 10 shows the non-monotonic relationship betweenρ and the
additional growth rates created by increased FDI for the financially
developed economies. The table depicts the relationshipwhen ρ>0, i.e.,
the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1 and the relationship when
the elasticity of substitution is less than 1 (ρ<0).38We also consider the38 The case where ρ=1 is the Cobb Douglas case discussed in the next section. For
values of ρ in the neighborhood of 1, there is a sharp discontinuity, and hence we do
not include ρ=1 in the table.effects for various values of μ. We see that as Yf and Yd become more
substitutable (ρ increases), the additional growth generated actually
declines. This is true for all values of μ considered here. This might
initially seem counter-intuitive. However, note that when the elasticity
of substitution is very high, combined with the fact that Yf already uses
technology that is twice as productive and μ is fixed, optimal allocation
would cause domestic output to have already been substituted by
foreign output as much as possible. Thus, further increases in Af create
only limited additional substitution possibilities and hence the
additional growth effects are small.
In the situation where the two products are complementary (i.e.,
ρ<0), we see again that increases in the elasticity of substitution
(i.e., as the absolute value of ρ falls) leads to lower additional growth
rates. However, note that the effects are actually even smaller here.
The overall impression one can draw is that the introduction of amore
advanced technology by theMNEwhile raising the growth rate, seems
to be less effective when a) the products are complementary (i.e.,
ρ<0) and b) the products become more substitutable (i.e., higher
positive values for ρ). The table furthermore shows that these results
remain unchanged across alternative initial values of foreign presence
in the market, i.e., for alternative values of μ.
Another legitimate sensitivity analysis would be to consider the
effects of asymmetric upstream intermediate input shares (i.e. λf≠λd).
For example, it is possible that multinational firms locate in a country
and provide financing and specific technology to intermediate input
producers but also require exclusivity contracts. A simplified way of
thinking about this would be to consider the implications of λf>λd in
the model. Needless to mention this would reduce the extent of the
spillovers. In the extreme case where λd=0 there would no spill-
overs. However, the growth effects of FDI would still remain and so
would the effects of greater financial development on economic
growth. An unfortunate implication is that depending on the
elasticity of substitution, growth would be explosive or implosive.
This ismainly a consequence of the fact that the foreign and domestic
firms now benefit asymmetrically from technological progress.
While there is only one growth rate of technology (ṅ/n) in this
economy, because of unequal intermediate shares, the sectors benefit
asymmetrically. For example, consider the case where domestic and
254 L. Alfaro et al. / Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010) 242–256MNE processes are complementary (i.e. ρ<0). In this situation, even
though domestic firms benefit less from technological progress and
thus have lower real output growth and also lower nominal growth,
they have an increasingly larger share of the economy and thus the
overall growth rate of the economy is driven towards zero. This is
nothing but amanifestation of the well known Baumol's Cost Disease
(Baumol, 1967). With unbalanced technological progress and
complementary products, the slower growing sector takes up a
larger share of the economy and drives down the overall growth
rate of the economy. Obviously this makes it difficult to undertake
any sensible calibration and the problem is not particular to our
model.39
4. Conclusions
Although there is a widespread belief among policymakers that
FDI generates positive productivity externalities for host countries,
the empirical evidence fails to confirm this belief. In the particular
case of developing countries, both the micro and macro empirical
literatures consistently find either no effect of FDI on the productivity
of the host country firms and/or aggregate growth or negative effects.
In this paper, we try to bridge this gap between the theoretical and
the empirical literatures. The model rests on a mechanism that
emphasizes the role of local financial markets in enabling FDI to
promote growth through the creation of backward linkages. When
financial markets are developed enough, the host country benefits
from the backward linkages between the foreign and domestic firms
with positive spillovers to the rest of the economy.
Our calibration exercises show that an increase in FDI leads to
higher growth rates in financially developed countries compared to
those observed in financially poorly developed ones. Moreover, the
calibration section highlights the importance of local conditions
(absorptive capacities) for the effect of FDI on economic growth. We
find larger growth effectswhen goods produced by domestic firms and
MNEs are substitutes rather than complements. Policymakers should
be cautiouswhen implementing policies aimed at attracting FDI that is
complementary to local production. Desired complementarities are
those between final and intermediate industry sectors; not necessarily
between domestic and foreign final good produces. Finally, by varying
the relative skill ratios–while assuming that MNEs use skilled labor
more intensively–our results highlight the critical role of human
capital in allowing growth benefits from FDI to materialize.
Some caveats are in order. We have focused on only one kind of
spillover. There are likely to be additional spillovers and technology
transfers. Besides, our results are based on a model that takes FDI as
given. The decision of a firm to outsource or invest abroad (and the
potential to generate linkages) may depend on the conditions of the
country and on the characteristics of the firm. Furthermore, the
possibility of imported intermediate inputs would hinder the extent
of backward linkages. Future research should allow for tradability of
intermediate inputs, and for differential use of alternative sources of
intermediate inputs across domestic and foreign firms.
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Appendix A. Solving the model with a CES aggregator




































p̃d = ð1−με p̃1−εf Þ⇒ p̃d = pdð p̃f Þ; ð41Þ
ðβd + δαλÞ p̃d Ỹd
w̃u
+
ðβf + δαλÞ p̃f Ỹ f
w̃u
= L; ð42Þ
ðγd + ð1−δÞαλÞ p̃d Ỹd
w̃s
+
ðγf + ð1−δÞαλÞ p̃f Ỹ f
w̃s
= H: ð43Þ













We next list the steps involved in arriving at a solution for this
setup:
1) First of all note that we can use Eqs. (38) and (39) to express
efficiency wages as a function of the prices of foreign and domestic
goods,


























 !−ðγd + ð1−δÞλÞ
ðγf−γdÞ ;


















































f Þ=ϕ. Dividing Eq. (42) by
(43),
⇒
ðβd + δαλÞ + ðβf + δαλÞ p̃f Ỹfp̃d Ỹd
















Substituting this into the previous equations,








ðγd + ð1−δÞαλÞ + ðγf + ð1−δÞαλÞ p̃fp̃d
















Finally using Eq. (5), ð1−με p̃1−εf Þ
1
1−ε = p̃d, we can rewrite the
expression above to obtain,
⇒





































Thus solving for p̃f= p̃f⁎, where ⁎ denotes the solved value.
2) Given p̃f, we can again use p̃d
 = ð1−με p̃1−εf Þ 11−ε to back out p̃d.
3) Since we now have both pd̃⁎ and p ̃f⁎, we can also derive the
efficiency wages and the relative outputs. To derive the efficiency
wages, we can substitute prices into Eqs. (45) and (46), as to rewrite
them such that we have wũ⁎=w̃u⁎(p̃d, p ̃f) and ws̃⁎=w̃s⁎(pd̃, p̃f). More
explicitly, after some tedious rearrangements, we get,
w̃⁎u = AduΔAfuð p̃⁎d Þ
ðγf + ð1−δÞλÞ
ðγf−γdÞ ð p̃⁎f Þ
−ðγd + ð1−δÞλÞ
ðγf−γdÞ ; ð50Þ
w̃⁎s = AdsΔAfsð p̃⁎d Þ
−ðβf + δλÞ
ðγf−γdÞ ð p̃⁎f Þ
βd + δλ
ðγf−γdÞ; ð51Þ































4) We can write Ỹ f = Yð Ỹd; p̃⁎d ; p̃⁎f Þ:
5) Taking the unskilled labor market Eq. (42),
ðβd + δαλÞ p̃⁎d Ỹd + ðβf + δαλÞ p̃⁎f Ỹ f = w̃⁎u L;

















Finally, all this means that the growth rate of aggregate GDP
is ṅn ð1−θÞ:
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